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1. Introduction: critical Geopolitics@25 
1.1. Sara Koopman, Simon Dalby and Nick Megoran 
Gerard Toal’s/Gearóid Ó Tuathail’s Critical Geopolitics was published 
in 1996 in the University of Minnesota’s book series on borderlines, a 
series described as one concerned with the task of revisioning global 
politics. It was entirely appropriate that he was the first geographer to 
contribute to this series given his role in what was then the nascent field 
of critical geopolitics. In its pages he launched a trenchant critique of the 
representational practices of international politics that mapped global 
space. The book subjected the taken-for-granted geographical specifi-
cations of power and territory to critical review from a wide range of 
theoretical perspectives all designed to render strange the geographical 
constructions of the world map. 
The book in places reads as a manifesto for multiple critical en-
gagements across geography, international relations, and post-colonial 
studies. The opening vignette remains especially apposite. In it, Toal 
(1996), p. 1 recounts the fate of Richard Bartlett, an early cartographer 
sent to ‘draw a trew and perfet mapp’ of the north parts of Ulster to 
facilitate their governance by the English state. The locals resented the 
attempt to make their spaces known to this mode of governance and 
responded by removing the unfortunate map-maker’s head. Knowledge 
is power, and cartography is a particularly powerful part of state 
knowledge deployed, in this case, for processes of colonization, as well 
as for warfare. The British state was subsequently to create an institution 
called the Ordnance Survey to produce detailed topographic maps of 
many places, all the more effectively to control or wage war in those 
territories. Disputing this colonial mapping with its militarist heritage, 
refusing the imperial gaze, and contesting imperial knowledge together 
form the intellectual impetus behind Toal’s text and much of the liter-
ature that has followed under the rubric of critical geopolitics. 
That the colonial gaze shapes the way we know the world and each 
other in it comes home in the shifting spelling of Toal’s name. In a forum 
on the book in 2000, Jo Sharp and Matthew Sparke suggested that the 
work seemed disembodied. In response to this critique, he related that 
he grew up as Gerard Toal but began publishing in 1986 under his Gaelic 
name, among other things, as a way to “write back against the empire 
that had rolled across Ireland violently erasing Gaelic dinnsheanchas 
(place knowing) and anglicizing the landscapes and identities” (2000: 
388). The multiple spellings of his name persist in scholarly writing, 
highlighting the ambiguities in identity and location involved in the 
writing of critical geopolitics. As such, we retain them in these texts too. 
In organizing this forum to mark a quarter of a century since the 
publication of Critical Geopolitics, we are considering, in part, the legacy 
of Toal’s volume. But more importantly, as the title of this collection 
indicates, we are also raising questions of how the field now labelled 
‘critical geopolitics’ has picked up some of his early concerns and how, 
in a present moment troubled by territorial squabbles, xenophobic po-
litical rhetoric and great power rivalries, it has renewed the challenge to 
modes of geographical knowledge that subjugate people and eviscerate 
complex histories. Gerard Toal’s early work was partly a response to 
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what Les Hepple (1986) termed a ‘revival’ of classical geopolitical lan-
guage in the late Cold War. The world looks rather different in 2021 than 
it did in 1996, but ethno-territorialism and mappings in the interest of 
power remain tragically persistent. Likewise, the fracturing of 
post-Soviet political space and the rise of Chinese ‘Belt and Road’ 
geopolitical infrastructure have effected new revivals of classical 
geopolitics to explain the complex new political geographies of 
post-Cold War Eurasia (for example Sloan, 2017). This forum is moti-
vated by a desire to ask how the intellectual toolkit of critical geopoli-
tics, as set out a quarter of a century ago, has changed, and how it needs 
to change further to stay up to the task of critically interrogating 
contemporary geopolitical imaginations. 
Since Toal’s volume was published, the use of critical social theory to 
interrogate traditional geographical concerns has become widespread in 
Geography as a discipline. The intellectual ethos sketched out in Critical 
Geopolitics has informed myriad explorations of the political cartogra-
phies of violence in the ‘war on terror’ and its spin-off conflicts, and of 
the numerous bordering projects of states and of other wall-builders in 
subsequent decades. Feminist and post-colonial critiques populate the 
pages of scholarly journals much more so than they did in 1996. Studies 
specifically focusing on peace and modes of mapping that might facili-
tate it, rather than solely on the divisions and confrontations of tradi-
tional geopolitical rivalries, have also appeared in recent years. The 
sheer geographical complexity of peace processes is likewise a matter for 
disciplinary discernment—a topic to which Gerard Toal has subse-
quently devoted considerable attention. Methodologically, the field has 
been enriched by ethnographic and other fieldwork-based methods. 
On one particular point Gerard Toal was very clear back in 1996: 
critique in the academy is about multiplicity, not univocality. As such 
this forum does not attempt to forge a consensus, nor does it suggest that 
there is one mode of doing critical geopolitics. The richness of the many 
critiques over the last quarter century has made political geography a 
thriving venue for intellectual activity, even if at times the label of 
‘critical geopolitics’ has been applied very loosely to many diverse 
research projects. 
But what are the prospects for critical geopolitics now, a quarter of a 
century later? How might scholars who ponder the knowledge practices 
that underpin contemporary violence build further on the provocative 
critical analysis that Toal’s manifesto inspired? Where to now for critical 
scholarship on geopolitical themes? These are the questions we posed to 
scholars who have engaged with critical geopolitics in recent years. We 
present here their responses: five commentaries from a diverse range of 
perspectives and locations that illuminate the path we have travelled 
since Critical Geopolitics was published, and where scholarship may be 
heading in terms of how it addresses space, power, and geographical 
representation. In inviting contributors, we sought to recognise that 
Critical Geopolitics is a theoretically and empirically ambitious text that 
has been widely read within and beyond geography. We therefore have 
included scholars with longstanding theoretical and disciplinary en-
gagements with critical geopolitics (Jo Sharp and Gerry Kearns) as well 
as, in Rachael Squires, an early-career scholar who is taking critical 
geopolitics in new directions. We invited Alex Jeffrey because of his 
extensive work on Bosnia, one of the key venues for Gerard Toal’s 
subsequent research, and Vicki Squires (no relation to Rachael) for her 
engagements with critical geopolitics from a disciplinary position in 
international relations. We hope that readers will agree that this set of 
interventions, and Gerard’s response, indicate that a quarter of a century 
on, Critical Geopolitics, rather than setting a canonical limit on debates, 
has helped mould a field that remains intellectually vibrant, empirically 
open, and politically important. 
2. Critical geopolitics: still masculinist after all these years? 
2.1. Jo Sharp 
The early 1990s were an exciting time for political geographers like 
me. The critical alternative to conventional, realist geopolitics was 
newly emerging in a discipline just encountering poststructuralism. The 
newly articulated critical geopolitics of Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon 
Dalby inspired my own PhD thesis, which was to become the book 
Condensing the Cold War (Sharp, 2000a). Ó Tuathail’s 1996 Critical 
Geopolitics was the first full-length exposition of what this approach 
might achieve (although, of course, this was anticipated by Dalby’s 1990 
The Creation of the Second Cold War). 
In the time since, critical geopolitics has become somewhat solidified 
into a subdisciplinary identity, but at its inception, both Dalby and Ó 
Tuathail were clear that the yoking together of “critical” and “geopoli-
tics” was intended as an oxymoronic tension that could not be settled – 
critique must be restless and unending. What I think this has meant is 
that it is not just the contents and intentions of Critical Geopolitics itself 
that have had a significant impact on political geography in the last 25 
years; equally important have been the many productive critical en-
gagements generated around the work. The forum on Critical Geopolitics 
published in this journal in 2000 included the seeds of many of the key 
discussions and debates that have shaped political geography over the 
last quarter of a century. 
My research at the time focused on the role of popular culture on 
geographical imaginations, and hence on geopolitical discourse, and so I 
was critical of Ó Tuathail’s focus on the formal politics of statecraft. My 
commentary on the book suggested that Ó Tuathail’s view of popular 
culture was too limiting, rendering it little more than propagandistic and 
its consumers as unquestioning cyphers for the values of the elite. Since 
then, there has been a flourishing of work on the ways in which 
geopolitics is created and reproduced through different aspects of pop-
ular culture. This work draws out some of the “sociology of knowledge 
production” that highlights how certain ways of knowing the world 
come to dominate, but also recognises that there are always multiple 
ways of knowing. Indeed, there have been critiques of the very 
distinction Ó Tuathail made between formal, state and popular 
geopolitics. As Ciută and Klinke (2010) have put it, the sorts of popular 
geopolitics studied at the time – such as my own work on Reader’s Digest 
or Klaus Dodds’s (e.g. 2005) analysis of the James Bond films – were still 
the products of elite interests rather than emergent from a wider range of 
people. Those who have sought to study resistant forms of geopolitics, 
most notably Sara Koopman’s (2011) exploration of the alter-geopolitics 
of protective accompaniment, show much more effectively the ways in 
which non-elite practices and understandings of the politics of space can 
have challenging and transformative geopolitical outcomes. 
My own reflections instigated another direction of travel that has 
kept me occupied to this day. Reading Critical Geopolitics crystalised for 
me the sense that the approach was being dominated by men. I was often 
the only woman on critical geography panels at conferences, sharing the 
stage with the likes of Ó Tuathail, Dalby, Dodds, John Agnew, David 
Atkinson and James Sidaway. Others had commented upon the domi-
nation of political geography by men (Staeheli, 2001), but it seemed that 
this was even more the case for critical geopolitics. Of course, being 
dominated by men is not necessarily the same thing as being masculinist. 
And yet, Critical Geopolitics was overwhelmingly a book about men, with 
the effect that the book reproduced. geopolitics as a masculinist practice. 
Ó Tuathail’s intellectual history of geopolitical practitioners and critical 
geopoliticians is a history of Big Men (in order): Mackinder, Ratzel, 
Mahan, Kjellen, Hausehofer, Spykman, Bowman, Lacoste, Ashley, and 
Dalby. A few women are allowed into the footnotes, but the central 
narrative is one of the exploits and thoughts of men. The history of 
struggles for space and representation reduced to a male genealogy, not 
just when discussing the masculinist history of geopolitical strategies of 
elite practitioners, but also the interventions of “critical geopoliticians” 
(Sharp, 2000b, p. 363). 
Even the recognition of a popular form of geopolitics – to me clearly 
linked to the feminist insistence that the personal is political – was made 
without reference to feminism, such that even the pioneering work of 
feminist international relations scholars such as Cynthia Enloe (for 
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example her brilliant Bananas, Bases and Beaches from 1989) was 
apparently excluded from critical geopolitics. Moreover, the very 
approach taken seemed to reinforce this implied elite masculinist sub-
ject. Again, as I argued in the forum: 
Just as the geopoliticians that come under Ó Tuathail’s scrutiny 
present themselves as all-knowing observers of the world and predictors 
of its political future, so too does he stand apart, detached and all-seeing 
of their works (2000: 362). 
I developed these initial ideas further with Lorraine Dowler for a 
special issue of Space and Polity the following year that sought to make 
the case for a specifically feminist version of critical geopolitics. We felt 
that the privileging of decoding political texts was indeed a continuation 
of the masculinist practice of defining particular spaces as political, 
dynamic and important and thus excluding other practices by labelling 
them as every-day, reproductive and inconsequential. We argued that 
we needed to extend the range of spaces and performances considered to 
be political, and that to think in terms of a feminist geopolitics, it is 
necessary to think more clearly of the grounding of geopolitical 
discourse in practice (and in place) - to link international representation 
to the geographies of everyday life; to understand the ways in which the 
nation and the international are reproduced in the mundane practices 
we take for granted (Dowler & Sharp, 2001, p. 171). 
Importantly, we proposed the idea of a feminist geopolitics where the 
discursive, representational nature of geopolitics is held in tension with 
the embodied experiences of everyday life, to challenge discourses of 
hierarchical politics (that there is a “more” political sphere), and to 
recognise the otherwise invisible work done to reproduce “the interna-
tional” by those outside the formal sphere of statecraft. We sought to put 
the body at the heart of geopolitics as a counterbalance to the over-
whelmingly discursive nature of critical geopolitics at the time. But this 
was not a proposal for a non-representational geopolitics; we did not 
seek to dismiss the discursive nature of geopolitics, but to recognise the 
connections between everyday practices and the discursive creation of 
national and global spaces. 
However, in the 20 years since the introduction of the concept of 
“feminist geopolitics,” perhaps because of a fear of masculinist grand 
theorising or of falling into the same God’s-eye position for which crit-
ical geopolitics has been critiqued, this focus on the material and 
embodied has meant a shift of attention away from what we might 
imagine as the other ‘end’ of the entangled geopolitical spectrum: the 
production and mechanisms of domination of the global geopolitical 
gaze and of dominant subjectivities. 
In his reflections on the nature of critical geopolitics in 2010, Dalby 
expressed concern that the focus of critical geopolitics has shifted too far 
from the global ambitions of geopolitics. A focus on the “small things” of 
the everyday, he argued, without attention to how these were intimately 
entangled with the global projections of the “infrastructure of military 
violence […] eviscerates the political purpose of critical geopolitics 
precisely … by leaving out the ‘‘big things’’ (Dalby, 2010, p. 282). 
While feminist geopolitics has insisted on the very inseparability of 
the “little” and “big” things, Dalby’s assertion of the need to foreground 
the connections between apparently little and big things offers an 
important reminder. Feminist geopolitics has produced excellent ac-
counts of the consequences and impacts of geopolitical processes into 
everyday spaces providing a clear sense of the power of hegemonic 
geopolitics to inscribe identities and morality onto the bodies of various 
communities. But this is often presented (most often implicitly) as a one- 
way process. To address these challenges, new configurations of feminist 
geopolitics are emerging that draw on different feminist traditions and 
on new feminist materialities, to think through the ways in which the 
materiality of the everyday, of bodies and of things, are made together 
into geopolitical systems (Dixon, 2015; Sharp, 2020; Squire, 2015). 
There is no doubt that the stimulation of debates around the nature 
of critical geopolitics has driven this to become the most dynamic part of 
political geography in the subsequent two decades. The concept has 
been interrogated through the language of resistance (anti-geopolitics 
and alter-geopolitics), through critical examination of the spaces of 
geopolitics (popular geopolitics and domesticating geopolitics), and 
exploration of alternative geopolitical traditions (small state geopolitics, 
feminist and subaltern geopolitics), amongst others. If the original 
intention of “critical geopolitics” was to generate critique, there is no 
doubting its success. 
3. Beautiful the shaking of heads 
3.1. Gerry Kearns 
Brecht (1981, ll. 16–17) raised his poesy “In Praise of Doubt”: “O 
beautiful the shaking of heads | Over the indisputable truth!” In this 
spirit, Critical Geopolitics is a marvellous exercise in sustained scepticism. 
It destroys the pretence of objectivity in geopolitical writings from 
Ratzel to Kaplan, encompassing likewise the empiricism even of its 
critics, from Wittfogel to Dalby. To honour its legacy, let me trouble just 
a little the terms and consequences of the way Gearóid Ó Tuathail rejects 
this objectivism. 
The book contextualises and deconstructs, relying upon “Foucault 
mostly, but sometimes Derrida” (p. 18). I’ll start with the “sometimes”. 
Writing of Mackinder’s emphasis on training British schoolchildren to 
see the world as imperialists, Ó Tuathail notes the contradictory senses 
loaded upon the “natural”, as when Mackinder wrote of a “visualizing 
power which in rudiment is natural to the child and the savage” (p. 102). 
Reading pulls the eye and the mind towards signs rather than reality, 
and in socialising and civilising also dulls that scopic capacity so 
necessary to the strategic gaze and ambition of an imperial people. Ó 
Tuathail deftly returns to the conflation of child with savage in elabo-
rating the imperial gaze, for the global reach of Britons required less the 
playful arts of the child than the martial arts of the savage. It’s only 
natural, then, that the civilising mission of empire required the civilised 
people to become savage in order to prevent the savage people from 
practising their own savagery upon the civilised. If, by nature, humans 
are both child and savage, then, in following the dictates of nature, the 
civilised adult acts with the natural innocence of the first when using a 
violence of the second to counter the immaturity and primitiveness of 
the latter’s own violence. 
Less satisfying, to me at least, are what I would describe as word- 
games that perhaps only look Derridean. When Ó Tuathail writes of 
“sighting sites, placing places” (p. 104), I am intrigued by the second but 
not the first. To place a place holds my attention because of its inherent 
contradictions. To put something in its place requires that the something 
already belongs somewhere; but to place something is more volitional, 
as if the act assigns a belonging that follows but does not precede it. This 
sort of contradiction, very much like the amalgam as identity of nature, 
child and savage, can serve to absolve colonial power of responsibility 
for its violence. Acting in the name of a future it claims already to have 
founded, the imperial power aggressively resists challenges to its control 
in the name of the values it asserts its rule has secured but will establish. 
This, I think, is why colonial rule so often takes the form of the exception 
(Hussain, 2003; Kearns, 2006). Yet, lacking an affiliation by etymology 
or by common use, “sighting” is not related to “site” in quite the manner 
of “placing” to “place”. Perhaps I am pushing the word-games too far, or 
taking them too seriously, and so I now follow Ó Tuathail’s advice to 
“avoid the narrow textuality of the more literary uses of Derridean de-
constructionism” and move instead to the ways Ó Tuathail engages “not 
only geopolitical texts but also the historical, geographical, technology, 
and sociological contexts within which these texts arise and gain social 
meaning and persuasive force” (p. 73). 
Ó Tuathail attends closely to the recursive and dialectical relations 
between words and things. Concepts always presume frames of meaning 
and connote as norms far beyond the literal sense of what they denote as 
objects. This is the core of Ó Tuathail’s criticisms of the empiricism of 
both classical and radical Geopolitics, as when he concludes that 
“Mackinder’s texts are blind to that which makes sight possible, to the 
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codes of signification that designate a field of vision and establish con-
ditions of visibility, and to the rules of administration governing objects, 
events, and processes within this field” (p. 105). Yet, these conditions of 
possibility of meaning are more fluid perhaps than Ó Tuathail finds 
them. In other words, more work is done to make meaning within texts 
than I think Ó Tuathail allows, and the material setting is less con-
straining than I think he imagines. For example, when Ó Tuathail talks 
about the classical geopolitical gaze, he suggests that it “has its origins in 
the emerging geographical conditions of world order at the end of the 
nineteenth century” (p. 24), as if this functioned as a set of objective 
constraints upon what could be said or at least heard. In this context, he 
asks how Mackinder “addressed the imperialist dilemmas faced by 
Britain in a post-scramble world order” (p. 25). In a footnote, Ó Tuathail 
writes of the “global” view of Mackinder as “not a manifest but a pro-
duced condition” (p. 264). Yet, it seems to me that Ó Tuathail is sug-
gesting that around the end of the nineteenth century there was a real 
change in international relations that can meaningfully be described as a 
shift from an open-to a closed-space system. I think this way of reading 
context underplays the work done within ideology or by the essentially 
contestable terms and hierarchy of concepts that make up closed-space 
theories, of which Mackinder’s was only one (Kearns, 1984). Colo-
nialism did not switch from uncontested to contested in the manner 
Mackinder suggested. Even in Ireland, England and then Britain had to 
fight off invasions from Spain (1588) and France (1798), and the 
occupation of North America not only involved wars against indigenous 
peoples but also conflicts there with France, as with King William’s War 
(1688–97) and the Seven Years’ War (1754–63). Rather than a response 
to a new crisis with the novelty of competition between colonial forces, 
Mackinder figured a crisis in the form a transition to closed space so that 
the evolutionary biology that was the ideological structure of the day 
might be adopted by his discipline of Geography and adapted to the 
promotion of the colonial strategies that he wished to promote. Desire 
precedes description. 
Ó Tuathail comes closer to this conception of desire driving 
description when he writes of the founders of co-called realist Interna-
tional Relations who, in the 1950s, were busy “codifying what policy-
makers needed or, perhaps more important, were already thinking and 
practicing” (p. 169). In this respect, the struggle to define a national 
interest is always more than military. As outgoing US president Dwight 
Eisenhower remarked (1961) in his final televised address to the nation, 
the United States “annually spend on military security more than the net 
income of all United States corporations.” Such material interest could 
readily distort government priorities and dictate what policymakers 
need, or, indeed, think and practice. Just as the projection of closed 
space could capture Social Darwinism for a geographical reading of 
empire, so a projection of existential crisis and permanent insecurity was 
needed for what Eisenhower termed the military-industrial complex. 
Endless variations on the inherent incompatibility and mutual hostility 
of rival civilisations accompany paranoid projections of the dimensions 
of violence that impend doom for the United States. Faced with this 
complex and the intellectual servants it can command, it was late and 
lonely for Eisenhower to propose a global community “of mutual trust 
and respect”, a “confederation […] of equals.” Ó Tuathail sketches some 
of the ways this military-industrial complex works when discussing 
Edward Luttwak, who was a “defense intellectual” (p. 231), a “consul-
tant to various American and European corporations” (p. 232) and an 
affiliate of the CIA-funded Tevel Institute in Israel. What, then, is the 
task of a critical geopolitics in the face of this? 
I think a critical geopolitics must develop an alternative normative 
framework to that which drives realist International Relations, and 
which also cramps the critiques that develop symbiotically alongside it. 
Ó Tuathail poses to himself this question: “How is the spinning globe 
disciplined by a fixed ‘imperial’ perspective, by mapping projects that 
reduce the indeterminacy of place to a homogenized surface of space?” 
(pp. 185–6). Ó Tuathail responds by insisting on the messy specificity of 
places. In this way he counters this erasure of local difference—this 
“sucking [of] meaning out of the new global indeterminacies and con-
tingencies” (p. 231). There is a danger that asserting complexity in the 
face of ideological generalities breeds a new empiricist critique that 
avoids the task of developing bases for its own politics. I have taken 
small steps towards an alternative politics by returning to the essentially 
contestable terms of classical geopolitics and showing how even as they 
were being formulated, they were bent to quite different purposes by 
thinkers critical of the politics of what we now call classical geopolitics 
(Kearns, 2009). In his wonderful exposition of the metaphors of holo-
caust and quagmire as frames of meaning for a debate in the United 
States about, respectively, intervention and non-intervention in Bosnia 
in the period 1990–94, Ó Tuathail remarks on the humanitarianism that 
“corrupts humanitarianism” (p. 222). State-centric conceptions of in-
ternational relations contain the victims of conflicts within formal state 
boundaries, beyond the reach of international agency and screened by 
the sovereignty of independent states. Ó Tuathail wants a moral stance 
that can condemn ethnic cleansing in its own right, but there is precious 
little purchase for this human-rights perspective in the state-centric 
ideology of classical geopolitics. 
It seems to me a problem that Critical Geopolitics conceives of the 
world in broadly Westphalian terms. It thus presents the fundamental 
issue as the relations between states and, following the Social Darwinist 
logic of the classical geopolitics it critiques, understands conflict as the 
essence of those relations. In this regard, the book almost concludes with 
the observation that “[i]f geopolitical discourse is organically connected 
to one social phenomenon above all others in the twentieth century, it is 
militarism” (p. 255). Perhaps there are more entities than states, and 
more relations than conflict, and indeed more to economies than the 
capitalism that Ó Tuathail sees as producing the vertigo of postmoder-
nity. Finally, if I had to yoke geopolitics to one primary set of social 
forces as determining its agenda, rather than militarism, I would choose 
colonialism with its racism, and its making and unmaking of states, but 
also with its anticolonial and antiracist struggles that from time to time 
and place to place have checked colonialism and provided materials for 
a properly sceptical critical geopolitics. As Brecht, 1981, ll. 20–23 sug-
gested: “the most beautiful of all doubts | Is when the downtrodden and 
despondent raise their heads and | Stop believing in the strength |Of 
their oppressors”. Perhaps Ó Tuathail would agree, for his book begins in 
colonial Ireland and finishes by promising that critical geopolitics “is a 
small part of a much larger rainbow struggle to decolonise our inherited 
geographical imagination so that other geo-graphings and other worlds 
might be possible” (p. 256). 
4. ‘Making the tent bigger and better’: reflections on critical 
geopolitics 
4.1. Rachel Squire 
I am grateful to have the opportunity to reflect on the field of critical 
geopolitics, some 25 years after the publication of Gerard Toal’s seminal 
text of the same name. Making my way in the field a quarter of century 
after the book was written, it is noteworthy how it continues to be a 
formative text, facilitating understanding of the evolution of the sub- 
discipline. Throughout this time, it has also been exciting to see how 
the boundaries of critical geopolitics have been pushed, extended, and 
punctured in different ways. Often spearheaded by feminist scholars 
challenging what does and does not ‘count’ as critical geopolitics 
(Mountz, 2018), hegemonic norms have been unsettled and the realms 
of the political expanded. To borrow the words of Toal (1996), this forms 
‘a small part of a much larger rainbow struggle to decolonise our 
inherited geographical imagination so that other geo-graphings and 
other worlds might be possible’. Continuing to expand and make the tent 
‘bigger and better’ in this struggle (Hyndman, 2019, p. 22) is a both a 
key challenge and opportunity for political geographers. Here I briefly 
outline two key areas of expansion that warrant further attention, each 
centred upon care-full and more diverse approaches to this process. 
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Whilst Toal (1996:256) writes of the ‘multiple overlapping networks 
of power’ that constitute the geopolitical, these networks could still 
better account for non-human lives and worlds. As many have noted, the 
Anthropocene requires a radical re-assessment of our relationship with 
the environment and natural world. Notwithstanding this urgency, there 
is a need more broadly to attend to animals and other forms of non- 
human life that have remained relatively marginal (with a few excep-
tions) to scholarship in critical geopolitics. Just as Halberstam and 
Nyong’o (2018) call for a rewilding of theory, there is a need too to 
rewild critical geopolitics to account for the ways in which questions of 
power and space intersect with animal and non-human life. As demon-
strated in my work on the Cold War Sealab projects (Squire, 2020), this 
is important in accounting for the violence that often occurs at these 
intersections, in cultivating a sense of care for lives that are inadver-
tently or very deliberately embroiled and enmeshed within geopolitical 
projects, and in understanding how ‘new forms of wildness call to us’ 
and speak back ‘on all sides’ (Halberstam and Nyong’o 2018:453). No 
geopolitical worlds exist, after all, that are not already inhabited by life 
beyond that of humans. Moreover, as Jackman et al. (2020) have 
highlighted, other forms of non-human life are important in this wider 
process of re-wilding and re-animating the ‘rainbow struggle’ referred to 
by Toal. 
These might take a number of forms, whether that be sea spirits of 
Papua New Guinea (Childs, 2019) that proved instrumental in the push 
back against deep sea mining, or invisible beings in the forest hinter-
lands of the Philippines who actively shaped conservation practices 
(Theriault, 2017). Such actors remain in the margins of critical 
geopolitics, or as Theriault (2017) highlights, are deliberately sidelined 
in Western hierarchies of knowledge. One reviewer asked Anna Jack-
man, Johanne Bruun, Pip Thornton, and me, as we revised our paper on 
feminist territories and terrains (2020), what would happen if we 
approached geopolitical questions with the starting point of ‘birdsong 
instead of guns and maps’? We might also ask what critical geopolitics 
might look like if we started with perspectives, agencies, and often 
invisible non-human entities that exceed Western ontological frame-
works (see Sundberg, 2014). In addition to offering an opportunity to 
radically re-orientate approaches to geopolitical questions, such in-
terventions also speak to the continuing need to decolonise critical 
geopolitics and to the importance of embracing and ‘walking with’ 
multiple epistemologies and ways of knowing and being in the world 
(Sundberg, 2014, p. 42). 
Beyond the intellectual exercise of further expanding the remit of 
critical geopolitics, there are practical considerations too in ‘making the 
tent bigger but more importantly better’ (Hyndman, 2019, pp. 7–8). 
Twenty-five years on, and critical geopolitics could play a larger role in 
participating in the ‘rainbow struggle’ described by Toal. It could be 
argued that critical geopolitics is itself still relatively monochromatic. As 
has been documented, this greyscale results in part from the white, often 
masculine, and heteronormative underpinnings of the sub-field. While 
feminist and decolonial scholars have done much to challenge these 
norms in political geography more broadly, the question of who is able 
to participate in the process of breaking down existing power dynamics 
remains an important one (Grove et al., 2020). As has been highlighted 
by Radcliffe and Radhuber (2020), Jackman et al. (2020), Naylor et al. 
(2018) and others, this question is particularly pertinent in relation to 
calls to embrace ‘multiple knowledge holders’ (Radcliffe & Radhuber, 
2020, pp. 1–2). As Desai’s (2017:322) work also demonstrates, however, 
such calls can only go so far in a discipline that is distinctly white. In the 
case of the United Kingdom, from where I write, people from Black and 
Minority Ethnic (BAME) backgrounds make up only 4.3 per cent of UK 
academic geographers. 
Whilst receiving less attention within geopolitical discourse, pre-
carity and casualisation within the academy only compound this issue, 
disproportionately affecting BAME scholars (Desai, 2017). Alongside 
this, casualisation has other important intersectional effects. As Hughes 
(2021) and Ivancheva et al. (2019) powerfully illustrate, women, those 
with caring responsibilities, and LGBTQ + communities (Zheng, 2018) 
are also disproportionately affected. This is important as these are voi-
ces, perspectives, and bodies that are already underrepresented in crit-
ical geopolitics. The prevalence of fixed term contracts (see Megoran & 
Mason, 2020; Peters & Turner, 2014), expectations of being endlessly 
available, highly mobile and unattached to ‘one’s care and love re-
lations’ beyond work (Ivancheva et al., 2019, p. 450, Mazi et al., 2019), 
the overloading of precarious staff, and the perpetual anxiety experi-
enced by early career scholars (Butler-Rees & Robinson, 2020) are 
increasingly damaging to efforts to secure a vibrant and diverse 
sub-discipline. The future of critical geopolitics rests on innovative 
thinking and ideas, and on a capacity to be agile, responsive, and 
engaged with contemporary challenges. It therefore also rests, not only 
on diversification, but on taking a step back to recognise the many sti-
fling effects of casualisation and in cultivating an ethic of care and re-
sponsibility to colleagues operating within these contexts. 
5. Geopolitical continuities and change 
5.1. Alex Jeffrey 
Critical Geopolitics is a landmark text that is an essential read for any 
scholar of political geography. While a touchstone for research, I also 
use the book as a foundation for my teaching on both the history of 
geopolitics and critical approaches to international relations. Students 
love it, welcoming its conceptual depth. It leads on to an investigation 
into Toal’s later works examining the reconstruction of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Toal and Dahlman, 2011) and the geopolitics of Russian 
militarism (Toal, 2011). Its sophistication and breadth introduce the 
reader to a history of geopolitical thought and identify the significance 
of the ‘geopolitical gaze’, a term that draws attention to the prominence 
of the visual register in shaping normative accounts of international 
relations. 
In this brief intervention I want to consider one element of the book’s 
narrative, that is the chapter examining the US government’s approach 
towards the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s (Between a 
Holocaust and a Quagmire: “Bosnia” in the U.S. Geo-political Imagination, 
1991–1994). The chapter identifies the considerable ambiguities and 
misinformation that shaped the construction of geopolitical imaginaries 
of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina within US Government circles. 
For Toal, such uncertainty oscillated between two poles: on the one hand 
the Bosnian war was represented as a potential repeat of the ill-starred 
US military intervention in Vietnam; and on the other a modern-day 
genocide for which the international community had a moral obliga-
tion to intervene. One of the benefits of writing twenty-five years later is 
we can place this discussion in a historical context, and in the case of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, it allows us to view how threads of Toal’s 
observations and analysis can be viewed in the present. 
Twenty-six years ago, in December 1995, every effort was made to 
demonstrate the end of the Bosnian war. From the choreography of 
negotiations in Dayton, Ohio, to the theatricality of the signing cere-
mony in the Palace of Versailles, through to the final text that opens with 
a self-description as “a comprehensive settlement to bring an end to the 
tragic conflict in the region,” all attempted to convey a sense of finality. 
The chief negotiator even wrote a book called To End a War (Holbrooke, 
1998). Such an ending also marked a set of ‘beginnings’, not least the 
rise to prominence of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) as an 
international organisation responsible for implementing the civilian 
aspects of the Dayton Peace Accords. Two years after the signing cere-
mony, the OHR assumed legislative and executive powers over the 
Bosnian state, a move justified as necessary to challenge domestic po-
litical opposition to the agreement. In these terms Bosnia and Herze-
govina became a ‘post-conflict’ environment, where the challenge 
became one of ‘reconstruction’ of fragmented political and social 
institutions. 
The problem, of course, is that the war did not end. The physical 
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violence largely ceased, but the geopolitical strategies that underpinned 
the war continued. As is well-established, the Dayton Peace Accords only 
entrenched the imagination of a fusion between territory and identity by 
dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina into two sub-state entities: the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (RS) 
(Campbell, 1999). In a sense it was an act that constitutionally enshrined 
precisely the ambiguity that Toal recognised in the US governmental 
response to the violence: a realpolitik that recognised the division of 
Bosnian space coupled with a moral duty to protect a multicultural state 
and to refute ethnic cleansing (i.e. through the retention of the inter-
national borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the right of refugees to 
return to their pre-war homes). 
The considerable scholarly scrutiny of the international-sponsored 
efforts to reconstruct the Bosnian state in the years since the Dayton 
Accord continue to support a sense of ambiguity concerning the nature 
and purpose of intervention. The echo of imaginations of ‘quagmire’ and 
‘Holocaust’ reverberate into the present, where they continue to shape 
institutions while undergoing reformulation. In institutional terms, at-
tempts to hold individuals to account for the violence committed during 
the conflict appear to facilitate an end to impunity for atrocity crimes 
and to support the desire among international agencies to implement 
humanitarian law. Certainly, commentators have seen the creation of 
institutions such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) as an exercise in ‘norm change’, where the operation 
of an international court – however remote – generates compliance in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina around the conventions of human rights (Net-
telfield, 2010). While this could be taken to align itself with Toal’s 
invocation of the moral outrage of the Holocaust, the wider enactment of 
such legal redress has, at times, only emphasized international reticence 
at involvement in Bosnian affairs. The limited mandate of the ICTY, the 
barriers to its initial operation and the contested processes through 
which the jurisdiction over war crimes trials were ‘localised’ to Bosnian 
institutions can all be seen as a lingering specter of the ‘quagmire’ 
(Hazan, 2004; Jeffrey, 2020). 
But with continuities come change. Updating the analysis of Critical 
Geopolitics today could involve looking beyond the decision-making in 
Washington DC to recognise new constellations of international pres-
ence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the 1990s and early 2000s there was 
an emerging post-Cold War consensus as to the future of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: it was on a trajectory from its Dayton past to a future 
within the European Union. In a sense, the conditionality that sur-
rounded European membership was imagined by external actors as a 
replacement for the powers claimed by the OHR (ÓTuathail et al., 2006). 
In the intervening years the political consensus in Bosnia and Herze-
govina around a ‘European future’ has disintegrated, a consequence of, 
inter alia, animosity towards continued external governmental author-
ity, the divisions between (and within) the two entities, the conse-
quences of the European financial crisis, the response to increased 
refugee movement, and new geopolitical affiliations. This latter point 
has taken a number of forms. Perhaps the most prominent has been the 
closer diplomatic relations between the RS and Putin’s Russia. RS 
leaders have drawn on shared cultural traits, notably Orthodox Chris-
tianity, to build diplomatic and economic ties with Russia and perform 
cultural distinction from other communities within Bosnia and Herze-
govina (Jackson & Jeffrey, 2019). Alongside these public performances 
of allegiance, Bosnia and Herzegovina has also played a role in China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative. Notably since 2012 it has been a member of the 
Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries 
initiative, an agreement that has helped fund power plants near the 
cities of Banja Luka and Tuzla. 
It is a rare geopolitical text that remains relevant a quarter of a 
century after its original publication. In the face of changing theoretical 
and methodological approaches, Critical Geopolitics remains a powerful 
account of the significance of external geographical imaginations in 
shaping geographical realities. 
6. Materialisations of critical politics 
6.1. Vicki Squire 
In 2014, I wrote an article asking how the insights of ‘the materialist 
turn’ might contribute to the critical reshaping of geopolitics as a field of 
research (Squire, 2015). This was not intended to discount existing calls 
for a critical appreciation of materiality, which had already been 
advanced from various angles (e.g. Dalby, 2002; Dowler & Sharp, 2001; 
Ó Tuathail, 2003). Rather, it involved a series of reflections questioning 
what challenges a renewed emphasis on materiality might pose for 
scholars focusing on the representational, cultural and interpretive di-
mensions of critical geopolitics. 
While my discussion was not directly focused on Gearóid Ó Tua-
thail’s seminal book, Critical Geopolitics, it did raise questions about the 
field of scholarship within which the text has been so influential. One of 
the key questions driving the article was why many works in the field of 
critical geopolitics had been relatively slow to engage debates about 
posthumanism or the ‘new materialisms’ (Coole & Frost, 2010). Another 
was what it might mean for the field if the insights of a ‘mor-
e-than-human’ approach were engaged more fully. Contributions to 
these debates at that time were nascent in the field, and have, of course, 
advanced since my original article was written (e.g. Dittmer, 2015). 
To pose these questions again here will, I hope, shed light both on the 
enduring importance of Critical Geopolitics, and on some key issues that 
might benefit from further elaboration. Specifically, I hope to provoke 
discussion about the role of representation, the qualities of interpretive 
analysis, and the status of culture in the production of critical knowledge 
across the broad field of geopolitics. Reflection on these issues is not only 
beneficial for scholars in the field of political geography, but also across 
a range of related fields – including those toward which my original 
article was orientated: International Relations and critical border 
studies. 
Let me summarise the somewhat complicated argument advanced in 
my article as succinctly as I can. Accepting that critical geopolitics was – 
and remains – a rich and diverse field of scholarship (and, indeed, that 
Critical Geopolitics is a complex and sophisticated text within that field), 
the article nevertheless posed the question as to whether a concern with 
challenging the geographical determinism of conventional geopolitics 
had led to an overinvestment in representation, culture and interpreta-
tion in the field during the 1990s and early 2000s. It also asked whether 
a focus on the ‘geopolitical gaze’ facilitates a full enough appreciation of 
the generative dimensions of physical as well as social forces in relations 
of power. 
The article developed this argument through a closer engagement 
with the work of Karen Barad and Annemarie Mol. Barad (2003) pro-
vided the conceptual tools with which to reject a distinction between 
discourse and materiality, while Mol (2002) prompted a consideration 
of the merits of rejecting epistemological perspectivism in favour of an 
ontological appreciation of ‘multiple realities’. Together these works led 
me to propose an engagement with the concept of enactment rather than 
performativity, both to avoid any misunderstanding the latter term 
might engender, and to facilitate analysis of the social-physical forces 
that are implicated in the constitution of political boundaries. The 
article also asked what might be missed in an emphasis on plural per-
spectives over ‘multiple realities’, and in an emphasis on 
counter-narratives to hegemonic power as opposed to contestations over 
the messy dynamics of power and domination. 
I would like to elaborate these questions further here, as Gearóid Ó 
Tuathail reflects on the context and text of Critical Geopolitics twenty-five 
years after its publication. While my questions extend beyond the scope 
of the book itself, they nevertheless remain relevant to some of its core 
concerns. 
First, I would like to press Gearóid on the concept of performativity. 
As a classic text in the field, Critical Geopolitics inspired various decon-
structive analyses of the ‘geopolitical gaze’ manifest in a range of 
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popular and political performances. These have been crucial in exposing 
practices of statecraft and in challenging objectivist representations of 
global space. However, I would appreciate some further reflection on the 
potential limits of the concept of performativity, particularly at the 
contemporary juncture, whereby post-truth politics complicate the 
performative, and whereby a deconstruction of ‘performance’ (in its 
more conventional sense) may even risk distracting attention away from 
key dynamics of power. This also stands as an invitation to address the 
question of materiality and the ‘material turn’, insofar as this is a 
development that Gearóid accepts in the terms I have set out. 
Related to this, I also want to press Gearóid further on the question of 
power. Critical Geopolitics played a crucial role in highlighting the 
effacement of state violence on a global scale and the naturalisation of 
processes of imperial expansion and militarism through their represen-
tation as inevitable and eternal. One can hardly overlook the enduring 
relevance of this ‘enforce [ment of] the vision of space and power of a 
certain metropolitan spatial and political order over those marginalised 
groups … who would contest that order’ (1996: 55). Nevertheless, I 
wonder if a hegemonic perspective on power overlooks some more 
complex dynamics that are not simply contested via counter-narratives, 
but also in a range of more ambivalent and messy ways. In turn, might 
these belie more complex boundary formations than those of inside/ 
outside to which Critical Geopolitics gestures? I pose these questions with 
an open invitation to reflect on the legacy of Critical Geopolitics as a 
classic text within the field. The twenty-fifth anniversary of the book’s 
publication is an opportune moment to consider how it fares under 
changing times. Critical Geopolitics was of course published only seven 
years after the fall of the Berlin wall and five years before 9/11. Since 
this time, concerns such as those surrounding the impact of climate 
change and digital technologies have given new impetus to discussions 
about materiality in the shaping of politics and global space. The 
questions underlying my article have, in this sense, become more 
pressing over time. 
7. A quarter century of critical geopolitics 
7.1. Gerard Toal/Gearóid Ó Tuathail 
I want to thank the editors and contributors of this forum for the 
opportunity to revisit Critical Geopolitics, to respond to critiques of 
critical geopolitics more broadly, and to comment upon the future of 
critical geopolitics. After devoting most of my energies over the last two 
decades to field research on territorial conflicts in post-communist 
contexts, I find myself circling back to the theoretical foundations of 
geopolitics. Presently, I am working on a book that seeks to elucidate a 
set of concepts for the critical study of geopolitics on a planet that faces 
proliferating crises to the future of humanity. Critical geopolitics has its 
origins in a late twentieth century moment of existential crisis, the 
heightened tensions between the Soviet Union and NATO states in the 
early nineteen eighties, and the real prospect of a nuclear war and po-
tential toxic fallout and nuclear winter thereafter. While in university in 
Ireland during these years (distant from Cold War frontlines but not from 
potential radiation fallout), I sought to educate myself on the broader 
issues. Indeed, as Geography Society President, I managed to get E.P. 
Thompson, then the leading intellectual for the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament, to visit our university and speak on the Cold War and 
exterminism (Thompson, 1980). For me at least, the moment was 
formative. 
I mention this as background because by the time Critical Geopolitics 
appeared in 1996, the geopolitical context that generated the need for a 
pressing critique of dangerously militaristic geopolitics – the so-called 
second Cold War, trenchantly analyzed by two fellow countrymen, 
Fred Halliday (1983) and a trailblazing Simon Dalby (1990) – was 
transformed by the extremely fortunate end to the Cold War and the 
relatively peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union (though not in many of 
the places I subsequently ended up researching). Interstate war was still 
a reality as the first Gulf War underscored, but the stakes in wars over 
the control of hydrocarbon reserves did not seem existential. How wrong 
this proved to be. The ‘great acceleration’ in the human consumption of 
hydrocarbon fuels that began after World War II kicked into an even 
higher gear after the Cold War. The year I was born the carbon dioxide 
levels in the atmosphere (measured at Mauna Lao in parts per million) 
was 318.44. The year Critical Geopolitics was published this had risen to 
362.61. Today the figure is 414.18 and rising.1 We all know and feel the 
results, though we find ways to ignore the matter. The year 2020 rivalled 
2016 as the hottest year on record for the planet, with near record lows 
in Arctic Sea ice and unrelenting coral bleaching. By many global 
environment measures, the last twenty-five years have been the most 
destructive to the foundations of human habitation on the earth of any in 
our species history (Wallace-Wells, 2019). This is astounding. While 
gaining a reprieve from a potential existential threat caused by great 
powers deliberately waging or tripping into nuclear war, our globalized 
capitalist modernity has sped us toward a reckoning with the geophys-
ical and biogeophysical foundations of life, human and 
more-than-human, on planet earth. Great power geopolitics waned as a 
source of existential risk to humanity only for earthly geopolitics to turn 
up the dial on a heretofore ignored source of danger. Today we have 
multiple sources of existential risk entangled through each other: 
renewed nuclear war fears, a raging SARS CoV-2 natural pandemic, the 
prospect of engineered pandemics more conceivable that ever, un-
aligned artificial intelligence as a very real emergent risk, and the 
multiple cascading consequences of climate change and a hothouse 
earth scenario coming at us fast (Ord, 2019). Geo-politics is all around. 
Geo-politics is all the way down. 
This is the unavoidable context within which we debate critical 
geopolitics. As noted in the Introduction, critical geopolitics is an 
approach that is open. It lacks a textbook statement and core set of 
concepts, a disposition I saw as a strength at the time, but I now un-
derstand also proved to be a weakness. Students wanted thinking tools 
and methods to use it, and critical geopolitics provided no systematic 
account of these. This is one reason, among many, why it gained little 
traction within International Relations. Critical geopolitics did, how-
ever, prove to be a general inspiration to many within Geography while 
attracting growing criticism over the years. Let me briefly respond to the 
excellent questions raised here concerning feminism, normative politics, 
and materiality while underscoring that all deserve greater discussion 
than is possible here. 
I begin with feminism and the diversification of critical geopolitics. 
Jo Sharp revives a critique she made in 2000 that critical geopolitics is 
masculinist. “Reading Critical Geopolitics crystalised the sense I was 
developing of the approach being dominated by men.” While stating that 
“being dominated by men is not necessarily the same thing as being 
masculinist,” she then writes that “Critical Geopolitics was over-
whelmingly a book about men, with the effect that the book reproduced 
… geopolitics as a masculinist practice.” Sharp and Dowler felt the need 
to announce a ‘feminist geopolitics’ in contradistinction to it, pulling the 
critical study of geopolitics toward greater considerations of the body 
and the everyday. 
Feminist geopolitics has been a gathering point for some fantastic 
research. I do, however, believe that the assumption that critical 
geopolitics was implicitly anti-feminist is not accurate. It is ironic that 
Sharp should cite Enloe. Bananas, Beaches and Bases was a text I used 
multiple times in my teaching. I also wrote a piece alongside Critical 
Geopolitics about what a feminist perspective meant for consideration of 
geopolitics as a gaze (Ó Tuathail, 1996). Perhaps this piece should have 
been included in the book. I did not write Critical Geopolitics as a survey 
text so criticism of what it neglects is somewhat unfair. It is fair to 
suggest that the book is tethered to traditional understandings of 
geopolitics, namely as geo-strategy and as great power competition, 
1 See https://www.sealevel.info/co2.html. 
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even as it tries to expand how the concept is understood and used. 
Critical geopolitics at the outset was in a dependent relationship with 
the object of its critique. 
Importantly, deciding to research the ‘big men’ of the geopolitical 
tradition or the high politics of statecraft is not evidence that critical 
geopolitics is a masculinist practice. The book cites many feminist 
scholars – Pratt, Merchant, Harding, Jeffords, Fox-Keller, Kristeva, Iri-
garay –while my research on the high practice of statecraft has long 
noted the significance of gendered understandings and practices. Crit-
ical geopolitics is not masculinist and Sharp’s own valuable contribu-
tions and significant place in the tradition is evidence of this. 
I share Rachel Squire’s excitement at how critical geopolitics has 
been “pushed, extended, and punctured in different ways” over the last 
quarter century. Her own work on submarine life is a stimulating part of 
this. Clearly, we are in a moment of considerable flux in terms of heg-
emonic identity complexes in the US, the EU and the United Kingdom, 
and with traditional privileged hierarchal structures in full backlash 
mode. Universities partially suffer because of this while their leadership 
adjusts to ‘market forces.’ What must also be noted is how traditional 
bastions of hierarchal power are now more open to diversity without 
significant challenge to militarism. Minorities have risen to top positions 
across the US state but the foreign policy consensus around massive 
defense spending and global power projection has remained. Feminism 
and NATO expansionism are not incompatible (Doyle et al. 2021, p. 9). 
Second, I wish to address normative frameworks. Kearns highlights 
some crucial issues on this front. Megoran’s (2008) incisive questioning 
of normativity and critical geopolitics forced the question: is critical 
geopolitics itself a form of geopolitics? I think being geopolitical is un-
avoidable for any intellectual endeavour built around critique of power 
structures and power practices in world politics. Certainly, critical 
geopolitics is an alternative normative framework than political realism, 
which is a pliable and contingent tradition of advice to great power 
statecraft, and which tends to ignore the condition of distant strangers. 
Critical geopolitics does not have a country, but it does have a primary 
cause, which is ameliorating the looming existential risks we (and I will 
come back to this) currently face as earth dwellers. 
This cause requires alliances, one of which can be with political re-
alism. In the US today, the dominant form of political realism is the 
rhetoric of restraint and retrenchment—a rhetoric that challenges 
nationalist exceptionalism and global militarism (Walt, 2018). In the 
past, it was a rhetoric opposed to NATO interventionism in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (because Bosniaks were distant strangers). I 
welcome Alex Jeffrey’s revisiting of the chapter on US policy on Bosnia, 
underscoring its ambivalent character, and updating the geopolitical 
context to today. As he knows, the history of the Bosnian war became a 
wellspring for further interventionism by the US state, in Kosovo in 
1999, in Iraq in 2003 and in Libya in 2011. Preventing Benghazi from 
becoming ‘another Srebrenica’ justified a bombing campaign that 
toppled Ghaddafi and plunged the country into chaos and civil war. The 
‘new cold war’ between NATO and Russia now runs through not only 
Bosnia, Kosovo and Libya, but many other countries, as well, with 
deleterious results. Here we need to grasp how political realism can be a 
useful check on interventionist impulses that can too easily become 
vehicles for utopian schemes, or a will to power disguised as virtue. 
Much more needs to be done to build out critical geopolitics as a 
normative framework. Its collective subject, the ‘we’ cited above, can 
easily reproduce familiar Western hubris and privilege (not to mention 
Anthropocentric worldviews). But with relentless climate change forc-
ing major states to respond, debates on global security are here already, 
and progressive scholars should participate despite the compromises 
involved. I have sought to present critical geopolitics for policy debate in 
my own immediate context as a ‘thick geopolitics’ that is preferable to 
the moralized militarism that too often accompanies US liberal inter-
nationalism (Toal, 2017). Perhaps this is empiricist critique as Kearns’s 
noted. I suspect he will agree that militarism, colonialism and, as we saw 
with Trump’s Capitol Hill insurgents, nativist Christian nationalism are 
not separate social forces in the US context today. God, guns and glory 
are the affective pistons of settler colonialism. Challenging this locally 
and globally is imperative. 
Finally, I address materiality and critical geopolitics. Obviously, with 
atmospheric carbon and coronavirus variants shadowing our lives 
today, questions of materiality and of relational dependencies with 
more-than-human others are fundamental to critical geopolitics. I 
appreciate how carefully Vicki Squire laid out her challenge in 2015, 
refusing all-too-easy distinctions between materiality, discourse and 
texts that others used to criticize critical geopolitics. To me at least, 
critical geopolitics puts together discourse and political economy ma-
teriality. It always had concerns with ground-level material realities in 
conflict zones, a concern that endures in my research on attitudes in 
conflict zones. Our initial elemental fear was radiation from nuclear war 
or catastrophic failures like Chernobyl in April 1986 (Brown, 2019). On 
these innately materialistic questions, I found Beck’s risk society work 
helpful (Ó Tuathail, 1998). Certainly, questions of lively matter require 
engagement, most especially through a classical geopolitical literature 
that simultaneously recognised and restrained understanding of earthly 
forces and relations (Latour, 2018). Again, Simon Dalby is a trailblazer 
here, with work that helpfully wrestles with the challenge of the 
Anthropocene in ways that advance critical geopolitics (Dalby, 2020). 
Specifically, in response to Vicki’s two challenges, I would accept 
that the concept of political performativity has significant limits as an 
account of “key dynamics of power” (though I expect we differ on that 
which we hold to be key). Focusing research on great power competition 
and physical violence is understandable, but also limiting. As Beck and 
many other argued, we have a government of technological orders, 
commitments and machines that was built around, beneath and beyond 
structures of accountability. They have their own agency. Lively mate-
riality is not something novel to those long concerned with accidental 
nuclear war or automated cruise missiles (a final image in Critical 
Geopolitics). Nor is the realization that our lives are ruled by unsus-
tainable energy systems, economic rationality models and digital algo-
rithms that build in concentrations of power and environmental 
degradation as routine and rational. We are remarkably dependent upon 
biogeophysical processes and lifeforms that are almost completely 
invisible to us. And we are relative upstarts next to the geological 
timescale of the planet, other life forms and the space of the cosmos. The 
future of critical geopolitics lies in wrestling with the material mani-
festations of the existential crises that face us all today. The specter of 
extermination, deeper and more pervasive than Thompson knew, haunts 
the world. 
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Toal, G., & aka Ó Tuathail, G. (2017). Near abroad: Putin, the west, and the contest over 
Ukraine and the Caucasus. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
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